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ESSAYS
LEGAL LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
INNOVATION*
Richard A. Epstein**
Many of the major issues of health care today revolve around
two familiar questions to students of tort and regulation. What are
the proper institutional arrangements to minimize the level of risk as-
sociated with the delivery of products and services, and what level of
compensation, if any, should be provided to those persons who are
injured when the remaining risks materialize in losses? These ques-
tions are especially difficult in cases of medical innovation, where both
risks and rewards frequently are great. The enormous complexity of
issues is revealed by the range of institutional responses. Deterrence
and compensation can be accomplished through tort law, specifically
through suits for medical malpractice and products liability. Addi-
tionally, they can be handled by various forms of direct legislative and
administrative overview-from Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") control over drugs to institutional review boards in local
hospitals and medical centers. They also can be handled by private
contracts among the various parties.
Each system of controls works in a different way. Tort remedies
tend to operate by indirection: There is no direct supervision over the
behavior of the various parties who, it is hoped, are induced to per-
form properly by the threat of actions for damages. The administra-
tive controls, adopted in part out of the fear that some defendants
may prove insolvent or some harms-for example, death or serious
disabilities-will prove irreparable, represent direct public controls
that deploy a mixture of fines, inspections, licensing, and approvals to
prevent most losses from occurring. The private contractual element
is designed to preserve for patients and consumers some measure of
autonomy and choice, at least within the constraints of tort law and
direct regulation.
The hardest problems arise over the mix of remedies. I will start
with the tort approach to these questions, specifically medical mal-
* Reprinted substantially, with permission from Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical
Innovation, in Medical Innovation and Bad Outcomes: Legal, Social, and Ethical Responses
(M. Siegler, S. Toulmin, F. Zimring & K. Schaffner eds. 1987).
** Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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practice and products liability, and then consider how regulation
complements or substitutes for it. Although I refer to the issue from
time to time, I do not stress an argument that I have made elsewhere,
which is that contractual solutions for all the flaws are better than the
regulatory and tort alternatives that are so much in vogue today.' In-
stead, I want to address the various methods for the public control of
medical innovation, and indeed, medical practice generally. That in-
quiry begins with a discussion of the connections between medical
malpractice and products-liability law. Thereafter, it addresses the
integration of tort remedies with direct public control.
One central theme is that more need not be merrier. Throughout
this essay, I want to stress the importance of the coordination between
the tort and regulatory sides of the issue, and to emphasize the great
benefits that follow from the adoption of clear rules to handle com-
plex problems. Much of what I have to say is a plea for a return to
safe harbors, whether by custom or by statute, for new therapies or
products introduced into the marketplace. The sheer number of cases
that is influenced by possible private actions makes it imperative that
there be some known and observable standard to guide parties who
must act under the applicable legal rules. The present system tends to
offer injured persons repeated bites at the apple: It is commonplace to
examine medical or manufacturing practices under different stan-
dards, first in administrative and then in judicial settings. In my view,
the duplication of supervision is the source of conflict, cost, and con-
tradiction, all of which should be controlled to help medical innova-
tion, indeed medical treatment, proceed along rational lines.
This essay is organized as follows. Section one argues that the
rules of products liability and medical malpractice should be under-
stood as an integrated whole; that is, they are best understood if their
interactions with each other are taken into account. Section two ex-
amines the way in which these rules should be applied in three dis-
tinct contexts: routine cases and known risks, experimental treatment,
and routine treatment that reveals an unknowable risk. In each case,
the key element on which liability should turn is the proper transmis-
sion of information. Where the information to be transmitted is stan-
dardized in form, an official, uniform determination of its adequacy
should be made before it is disseminated, not afterwards. As in so
many areas of law, the greatest mistake in the current liability rules is
their excessive ambition. Certain major risks can be controlled at a
low price; but, in the effort to endow the system with a certainty that
1 For that argument, see Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am.
B. Found. Res. J. 87.
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it cannot possess, the limited, but vital, gains that are possible are
systematically undone. The best again becomes the enemy of the
good.
I. THE COMMON LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The two bodies of tort law most relevant to questions of medical
innovation are medical malpractice and products liability. The con-
ventional understanding places them in separate domains. For physi-
cians, liability is said to depend upon negligence, with its usual
elements of duty, breach, causation, and damage. Liability for prod-
ucts is said to be strict, i.e., proof of negligence is irrelevant once the
causal connection between the product defect, however defined, and
the plaintiff's injury is established. The difference in liability rules is
then reflected in two critical but subsidiary points. Where negligence
is the test of liability, custom becomes at least probative, and in medi-
cal contexts is often regarded as dispositive in determining the stan-
dard of care.2 Where negligence is irrelevant, then customary
practice tends to become irrelevant as well. Where negligence is the
test of liability, res ipsa loquitur, "the thing speaks for itself," may
assist in drawing the inference of negligence from proven facts.3
Where it is not, then the principle is said to be as irrelevant as the
negligence that res ipsa could help to establish.
These traditional views of the subject tend to mislead. The simi-
larities between medical malpractice and products liability are far
more pronounced than the usual accounts might otherwise allow.
The critical point often depends not upon the status of the defendant,
2 See, e.g., McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549
(1959); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147, 1164-65 (1942). Some doubt
has been raised on the issue by Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (oph-
thalmologist's failure to administer simple, inexpensive, and risk-free test to 32-year-old plain-
tiff for glaucoma constituted negligence, even though custom in profession was to give test only
to persons over 40-years-old). While the decline of custom in medical cases has probably
enjoyed a subterranean existence, the rule has not spread much beyond the glaucoma-testing
cases that gave it its birth. See, e.g., Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979)
(glaucoma is unique in its symptoms and deserves unique treatment).
3 The standard formulation of the res ipsa doctrine reads as follows: (1) the event must be
of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence, (2) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) it
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 9 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2509 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). Note that the standard can be
adapted to strict liability cases simply by eliminating the first requirement, so that it calls for
proof of causation by elimination of both third-party conduct (by the second requirement) and
plaintiff's conduct (by the third requirement). R. Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law
162-65 (1980).
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that is, not upon whether the defendant provides medical products or
medical services, but upon the nature of the enterprise in which that
defendant is engaged and the types of risks that must be confronted.
That the same pattern of liability rules should emerge in both areas
should not be surprising. Most medical treatments involve coordi-
nated interaction between the providers of both goods and services.
As the goods and services work in combination, so too should the
liability rules that govern them.' The ideal system is one which
makes the choice between different inputs to health care turn on the
benefits they provide. Where products are subject to more stringent
standards than medical services, there is a risk that treatment (serv-
ices) will be substituted for products (goods), even when the latter is
more suited to the task.'
Consider the traditional distinction between liability for bad serv-
ices and liability for bad products. By hornbook law, liability for
products is strict and that for services is not. Yet, in particular in-
stances, the alleged disparity could only be a source of difficulty.
Thus, in some of the early hepatitis cases, the issue was the appropri-
ate standard for holding a blood bank liable when a transfusion
caused hepatitis in the recipient. Those cases which took the line
that blood was a product were willing to apply strict liability princi-
ples.7 Yet, if the provision of blood had been found to be a service,
negligence rules would apply. The obvious point is that the sale of
blood contains both types of inputs, so that the proper question is:
4 This approach works in other contexts as well. Thus, in order to understand the legal
regime for industrial accidents, it is necessary to examine the way in which the principles of
products liability interact with the principles of employer's liability both before and after the
advent of workers' compensation. See Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Struc-
ture of the Workers' Compensation Law, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 775 (1982), which seeks to explain the
restricted rights of action against manufacturers as an effort to focus liability for workplace
accidents upon the employer in order to reduce litigation costs and general uncertainty.
5 See Miller & Schaffner, Ethical and Legal Issues Related to the Use of Computer Pro-
grams in Clinical Medicine, 102 Annals Internal Med. 529 (1985). Miller and Schaffner pose
the question of whether computer programs should be strictly liability for wrongful results
when physicians are liable only for negligence. One argument against that configuration is that
it tends to retard the use of computer assists when they are more efficient than their rivals
because of the differential burdens their use imposes.
6 E.g., Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967) (discussing
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty causes of action, and distinction between
sale and service theories as basis for imposing liability).
7 E.g., Reilly v. King County Cent. Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246
(1971) (strict liability imposed on nonprofit blood bank that supplied blood on a fee basis). But
cf. Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1974) (supplier of blood
not liable under theory of strict liability since blood was incapable of being made safe).
8 E.g., Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132
N.W.2d 805 (1965) (negligence standard appropriate).
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What regime of liability will tend to increase the net benefits from
using blood, which is known to carry a certain risk? For reasons that
shall be developed later, the strict liability system tends to work awk-
wardly in this context, and the negligence standard (at least as prop-
erly defined) is preferable. But the structural point is that there is
little reason to have one standard of liability for the blood bank selling
the product and another for the hospital or physician-as provider of
services-using it. The distinction between products and services can
be viable in some contexts, but the determinants of liability should be
functional, not formal. As a general matter, close substitutes should
be subject to identical regimes of liability in order to avoid skewing
the choices between them. Indeed, in this area, where contracting is
possible, the question should not be decided collectively at all, for pri-
vate markets will work to create the desired parallelism in liability
rules.
II. FROM ROUTINE TO INNOVATIVE RISKS
The need for a systematic approach to liability across separate
systems is pervasive and applies whenever products and services are
used in mixed proportions. With medical malpractice it is important
to contrast, at the poles, the liabilities of physicians for routine prac-
tice with the liabilities of physicians who are engaged in developing
experimental or innovative techniques for diagnosis and treatment.
The intermediate case, of great importance and difficulty, is where a
standard practice turns out to have a systemic defect that was un-
known-and perhaps unknowable-at the time of its general adop-
tion. The same classification is at work in the law of products
liability. At the extremes, the rules governing the production of stan-
dard drugs are quite different from those governing the testing and
development of new drugs. Similarly, the intermediate case is one
where a standard drug turns out to have a uniform, undisclosed risk
that is revealed only years later.
The simple distinction between medical malpractice and prod-
ucts liability, therefore, must give way to a more complex inquiry; one
which asks how both products liability and medical malpractice law
respond to three dominant kinds of cases. It is useful to examine both
dimensions of the problem simultaneously in order to show how the
doctrinal differences between products liability and medical malprac-
tice can be harmonized once the institutional profiles of these three
different situations are understood. In particular, the pitfalls for inno-
vative treatments and therapies are by definition greater than those
for routine treatments and therapies. The rates of return for innova-
1987] 1143
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tive treatment may be very high, but so are the risks. Long-term la-
tent risks of routine practices and products are, if anything, more
difficult to control, precisely because of the apparent success of stan-
dard practice. Once treatment has passed from the innovative to the
routine without identification of its major adverse effects, the
probability of any loss occurring may be very low. Yet, should any-
thing be amiss, the danger of widespread disaster becomes far greater,
for even the prompt removal of the dangerous drug or treatment still
leaves large numbers of people at risk. Finally, routine treatments
with known risks are investments that have known returns whether
we speak of medical malpractice or products liability.
The question of the proper way to deal with a medical innovation
reduces itself to the treatment of these three cases. I shall begin with
the treatment of routine risks in routine cases and then move on to the
experimental and latent-defect settings.
A. Routine and Known Risks
1. Correction or Warning
As might be expected, the liability rules for routine cases are not
without controversy, although they are, in principle, the easiest to ar-
ticulate. The sources of risk are generally understood, and while they
may be great, efforts can be made to counter them. Sometimes the
appropriate defense is to eliminate the peril in its entirety. Therefore,
compensation after the fact need not be examined in the vast majority
of cases where the precautions are successful. Where correction is
possible before the fact, and where its benefits exceed its costs, some-
one will normally try to do it, no matter how the law sets the original
liability.9 The innovator need not be a party who has to bear the loss
in the absence of innovation. Thus, if the medical loss were left with
the patients, they would pay handsomely for any test that would re-
duce the risk. Similarly, if liability were imposed upon either a blood
bank or a hospital, independent firms would still have an incentive to
develop cost-effective tests. The new liability only means that blood
banks and hospitals, as well as patients (who rarely receive perfect
compensation for injury) would all be willing to pay the innovator a
price greater than the costs of production, but less than the loss
averted. It is for just this reason that drug companies introduce new
products whether or not they are at risk for liability. The hepatitis B
9 This is an example of the Coase theorem, which predicts that, when transaction costs are
low, voluntary exchanges that work to the benefit of both parties will take place, no matter
how the original liability is set. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1
(1960).
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vaccine, for example, was introduced after the vast majority of states
made it clear that liability for the supply of bad blood depended upon
proof of negligence and could not be maintained on a strict liability
theory. The same principles apply to new advances in medicine, most
of which are developed by persons who have no personal risk of
liability.
In other cases, however, correction of the peril is simply impossi-
ble, or at least too costly. In the extreme, the effort to remove the
risks of certain treatment can rob that treatment of its promised bene-
fits. Many lifesaving drugs have very serious known side effects. For
example, it is worth bearing the debilitating side effects of steroids in
order to control some life-threatening condition. Yet here, too, it
should be possible to avoid the question of damages by warning of the
side effects that follow from the use of this treatment or product. In
principle, there is a question of whether the warning should be di-
rected to the physician or patient. Where the information is technical,
there is good reason to warn the physician, who can in turn-as is
now required under the doctrine of informed consent-make the in-
formation intelligible to the patient and relate it to the concrete par-
ticulars of individual cases. In other circumstances, package inserts
for patients may be appropriate, if only as supplements to warnings
directed to physicians. Once informed about side effects, the patient,
who best knows his own preferences, can compare the risks and bene-
fits of treatment, allowing for the uncertainties of the case.
More controversially, I believe that one can go further. So long
as there is notice to the patient that information is needed, it becomes
possible for him to make independent inquiries, through a second
opinion, for example, on how to treat the known risks and hazards.
The key point, therefore, is to assure that relevant information is
transferred, not necessarily that the defendant will do the transfer-
ring. In some cases, that burden will be assumed by the patient in
order to avoid the need to refer to third parties; but in other cases, the
independent judgment may well prove essential to the job. Indeed, it
may well be that this system is far better than one which demands
that generic warnings-especially in products cases-be complete, for
second opinions allow the individuation of risk in a way that any col-
lective determination of standardized warnings does not.
No matter how one phrases the duty-to-warn question, the trans-
fer of information to the proper party should be the limit of the rele-
vant duty for both the drug company and the physician. Once all the
benefits and costs of any action rest upon the same individual, there is
no danger that one person, say, the physician, will externalize costs
1987] 1145
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while preserving benefits. The normal conflict of interest between pri-
vate contracting parties is therefore eliminated, either by transferring
a safe product, or by providing accurate information as to why and
how the product is dangerous, or even by providing information
about the need to inquire further about certain material risks. Infor-
mation transfer is the key. Accordingly, the patient's decision should
not be reviewable anew in the public arena by some social cost-benefit
calculation. Legal intervention has placed it in the hands of parties
with every incentive to get it right.
In doctrinal terms, this argument leads to the adoption of a posi-
tion which says that the patient assumes the risk once the relevant
information about the risks is received. 10 It contrasts with the view
that liability should turn in any way on the reasonableness of the pri-
vate evaluation, corresponding to the principle of contributory negli-
gence, which accordingly should be kept out of the discussion. No
one should claim that every person always does his sums correctly
under conditions of uncertainty and stress. But it is proper to claim
that the inevitable errors of calculation made by individual patients
should not be the source of extensive liabilities for either physicians or
manufacturers who have properly supplied the relevant information.
2. The Choice of Liability Rule
a. Fitness of Goods and Services
The next question is what rules of liability should be used to en-
sure that a safe course of action is taken or proper information sup-
plied? With correctable risks, I think that the appropriate standard of
liability is strict in both medical malpractice and products liability.
10 Alan Weisbard objects to my reliance on the assumption-of-risk defense, which he notes
has been widely rejected by both courts and scholars in the industrial accident cases that gave
it birth. Weisbard, On Not Compensating for Bad Outcomes to Biomedical Innovation: A
Response and Modest Proposal, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161 (1987). He is clearly correct about
the unkind reception that the defense has received in the 20th century, but I think he is wrong
on the merits. The theory of assumption of risk is that the parties themselves are the best
judges of the risks they want to take. So stated, the defense is required by the principle of
individual autonomy that Weisbard himself prizes. The weakness of the defense has always
been the risk of imperfect information, be it by patient or employee. Yet the system of warning
is designed to obviate just that problem and to allow individual patients to make whatever level
of additional search they think appropriate, given their own taste for risk and their desire for
information. There is no reason to assume that parties, once informed, would not act in their
own best interest in regard to industrial accidents. Many large firms developed explicit, volun-
tary compensation programs for their workers before the advent of the compulsory workers'
compensation system. The emergence of such programs is wholly inconsistent with the domi-
nant legal view that the employment relationship systematically exploited workers. Yet, it is
wholly consistent with the view that contracts are struck for the mutual benefit of the parties.
See Epstein, supra note 4, at 819.
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Indeed, I believe further that this solution would be adopted consen-
sually even if not required by law. But strict liability for what?-for
the requisite standard of treatment or for the wholesomeness of the
drug, not for the cure or recovery of the patient. In essence, there-
fore, the defendant becomes an insurer, but only of his own product
or conduct, not the health of the patient.
Within the framework of medical malpractice, this result is
reached in essence under the negligence rubric, where the custom of
the profession becomes the standard of care. The traditional formula-
tion understates the strictness of the rule by treating custom as one
deposit of a uniform standard of reasonable care. But while the scope
of the strictness may be narrow, within that domain it is remorseless.
There is, of course, more than one permissible approach to a given
problem, and it is possible to depart consciously from a known but
fallible procedure in an effort to find a superior alternative. Yet put-
ting these complications to one side, the physician who deviates from
the permissible procedures by inadvertance does so at his own peril. 1
He can surely defend himself on the ground that the deviation in
question was not causally connected with the losses in question, an
issue of great difficulty when the inferior treatment only works to in-
crease the probability of loss. 2
There is a precise parallel with respect to the production of
drugs. Under the law of products liability, there has emerged a three-
fold classification of defects: production or formula defects, warning
defects, and design defects. Where a drug is manufactured that does
not meet its own formula specifications, then the construction defect
is established. It is no defense to say that all reasonable care was
taken in order to produce the safe product. As before, the finding of
liability does not follow from the finding of defect because of the lurk-
ing causal difficulties that remain. But with liability clear, cases of
this sort are rarely tried today once the factual matters are resolved.
ll The "at peril" language occurs even in 19th-century cases on the subject. See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y.
696 (1872); Cowan & Bertsch, Innovative Therapy: The Responsibility of Hospitals, 5 J. Legal
Med. 219, 220 (1984).
12 One possible rule is to make all-or-nothing determinations on a case-by-case basis, and
then to award full compensation in some cases and none in others. Another method is to seek
to determine the extent of the increased risk and to award compensation on a probabilistic
basis. The error rate of both procedures is, of course, very high. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) (even though decedent's original chances
of surviving lung cancer were less than 50%, evidence that defendant's failure to properly
diagnose the illness reduced decedent's chances of survival by 14% was sufficient to allow the
proximate cause issue to go to the jury). See Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compen-
sation for Tortious Risk of Harm, 14 J. Legal Stud. 779-98 (1985).
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Strict liability makes good sense in both the medical and prod-
ucts contexts. The control of risk lies exclusively within the hands of
the defendant, as it is unlikely that any unusual conduct by an indi-
vidual plaintiff or by any third party can change the magnitude of the
risk.'3 The questions of product misuse or patient behavior are of
very minor importance and are best handled by affirmative defenses,
which should apply when a consumer knows, say, because of discolor-
ation or smell, that the drug is indeed defective.14 These rare cases
aside, a simple rule which says to the defendant, "bear the losses that
you have caused," will serve to induce the appropriate level of care,
with a minimum of administrative costs, and without creating any
unwarranted distortions in the patient's behavior.15 Creating the lia-
bility also works to the benefit of both the physician or manufacturer,
as the case may be, and the patient, because it induces individuals to
accept the services or goods in question even when they cannot fully
understand what the services are or how the drug is manufactured.
The rules of liability state with sufficient clarity what outcomes
should follow if an accident occurs. They give a neutral road map
that allows disputes to be resolved in accordance with known and
reliable standards when and if they occur. Thus, investigation into
standards does not have to be undertaken upon receipt of the drugs or
treatment, when the probability of any failure or defect is too low to
warrant it. '
6
The pattern of mutual benefit suggests that such rules would be
adopted by contract where these are permitted by law (as they now
are not) and that they should be kept, at least as "off the rack" provi-
sions to minimize the cost of contracting when they are allowed in
these areas. One persuasive piece of evidence of the desirability of the
powerful, but limited, domain of strict liability comes from the vari-
ous proposals for reform in both medical malpractice and products
13 There are many cases in which the plaintiff's conduct is critical, as with operators of
machine tools and drivers of automobiles. For a discussion of the mistakes that arise when this
conduct is downgraded or overlooked, see Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market,
14 J. Legal Stud. 645-69 (1985).
14 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment n (1965).
15 There is an extensive literature devoted to the proposition that the optimal negligence
standard, defined as taking all cost-justified precautions, will yield the same outcome on care,
even if a different result on compensation. The classic formulation is still that put forth by
John P. Brown. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973).
But the administrative-error costs of the rule have led-rightly, in my view-to its rejection in
these bad-batch cases. On the question of error costs, see, e.g., Grady, A New Positive Eco-
nomic Theory of Negligence, 92 Yale L.J. 799 (1983).
16 1 have elaborated on the use of custom as an antidote to imperfect information in Ep-
stein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foundation for Medi-
cal Services, 49 J.L. & Contemp. Probs. 201 (1986).
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liability. During the ebbs and flows of the past ten years, both physi-
cians and manufacturers have worked to restrict the scope of liability
rules, but none of their proposed reforms has been directed toward
the stringent liability rules at issue here.
Most efforts by physicians to revise the rules of liability in medi-
cal malpractice cases have centered on returning custom to its domi-
nant position, and not to inventing a position in which no liability
attaches to well-understood forms of malpractice. 7 Nor should we
expect otherwise, for within limits it is in physicians' interests to
maintain the warrantability of their services in order to induce indi-
vidual consumers to sign on with them. There are enormous imper-
fections in information in medical markets, none of which is
necessarily eliminated by direct regulation.
The same point is true for drugs. It would be nothing short of
calamitous for drug companies, which are often not in privity of con-
tract with their users, to be forced to try to duplicate by contract the
express warranties that the tort law now commands. In the swine flu
fiasco, the entire dispute among the drug companies, their insurers,
and the government was the question of the adequacy of warnings.
But throughout the dispute, the companies were willing to take full
responsibility for production errors, that is, for vials of vaccine that
did not meet governmental standards. Again, the warranty, on bal-
ance, costs the company less than it benefits consumers. The question
of liability standards, then, is pretty much solved in this easy case. To
be sure, many difficult matters of fact will arise in individual cases,
but these fact-dense issues (Who took what drug when?) have little
precedential value and do not raise any institutional concerns.
b. Warnings
The question of warnings is, however, more vexatious. Here, in
principle, the argument takes the form that whether we deal with
products or services, the physician or manufacturer meets his full ob-
ligation when all relevant disclosures are made, even if the outcome is
adverse. Within the law of medical malpractice, that proposition is
captured by the black letter law of informed consent, which empha-
sizes disclosure of the relevant risks of alternative forms of treat-
ment.18 Within products liability, that proposition is embodied in the
rules on the duty to warn of known defects, which adopt parallel stan-
dards of relevance and materiality. There are important differences
between the two areas. The physician, who has greater knowledge of
17 See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1987).
18 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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the patient's condition, must tailor the warnings to take into account
the personal idiosyncrasies of users in order to discharge his duty,
while the drug company's warnings are generally directed to generic
features of its products. Yet, in both cases, the central dispute in the
common-law cases is over what kind of disclosures are sufficient to
exonerate the defendant from liability.
In contrast to the flaws in the medical malpractice/drug produc-
tion defects determinations, the problem with warnings is the irreduc-
ible question of degree, for there is no single litmus test to determine
the adequacy of warnings. The intense disputes tend to belie the orig-
inal black letter proposition on adequacy, for it is easy to find cases
where extensive disclosures have been held (or so a jury could find) to
be insufficient. In practice, it becomes possible, under the dominant
standards of reasonableness, to argue that whatever warnings were
given were inadequate as a matter of course.19 Once the outcome is
known to be bad, some further warnings of adverse side effects must
be good, given that it would discourage the unfortunate course of ac-
tion. Yet the extreme position only reveals the false confidence of
hindsight. When the treatment was undertaken, or the drug adminis-
tered, there was some probability of a successful outcome as well as
some probability of an unsuccessful outcome. The ideal warning is
that which conveys the proper probabilities and their associated gains
and losses. Warnings that are too severe are as bad as those that are
too soft. Both tend to distort, if in opposite directions, the relevant
patient or consumer choices. The full costs of overwarning would
only be known if legal actions were available to people deterred from
taking needed therapy by excessive warnings. But these losses are
now obscured because of their intolerable administrative demands.
In the end, therefore, modern common law creates a bias, inten-
sified by the discretion left to juries, toward finding all warnings inad-
equate when judged by the standards of hindsight. On a selective
basis, the theory of improper warnings becomes an elaborate, expen-
sive, and erratic pretext for compensation for bad outcomes alone. As
every skillful trial lawyer knows, the question of the adequacy of
warnings is a form of reverse engineering. First find out what warn-
ings were given, and then tailor the claim to characterize them as
insufficient on grounds of inadequacy.
19 For those who doubt the proposition, see, e~g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th
Cir. 1977), discussed critically in R. Epstein, supra note 3, at 108-12. See also Kitch, Vaccines
and Product Liability: A Case of Contagious Litigation, Regulation, May-June 1985, at 11
(discussing Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974), and the issues of adequate warning labels and strict liability).
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What, if anything, can be done in order to prevent the risks of
overcompensation for bad outcomes when proper information is
transmitted? At this juncture, an important structural difference be-
tween the informed-consent cases and the drug cases, alluded to
above, influences the correct institutional response. The informed-
consent cases arise out of one-on-one interactions and are fact-dense.
Until the particular situation of each patient is known, it is impossible
to have a sense of what disclosures should be made. It seems impossi-
ble, therefore, to dictate any single form of words to govern all cases.
Thus, the best that can be expected of courts, if the doctrine is to be
retained at all, is to be aware of the twin perils of overwarning and
underwarning. Some comfort may be taken from the casual empiri-
cism of the trade; that it is very hard for a plaintiff to win a malprac-
tice action on a straight informed consent theory. There does not
seem to be any institutionalized response that can be used to replace
tort-law doctrine, even with the notorious difficulties of deciding in-
formed-consent cases.2°
The drug cases, however, do present systematic features that
make possible a coordinated institutional response to the problem of
imperfect information. Drugs and vaccines are distributed on a mass
basis, as was the case with the swine flu and Sabin live polio virus
vaccines that were so controversial in the 1970's and the ominous per-
tussis vaccine problems of the 1980's. It should be possible to stan-
dardize the warnings in advance in ways that resist legal liability after
the fact. What is needed, I believe, is a rule that provides that certain
warnings approved by, say, the FDA shall be conclusively regarded as
adequate in any subsequent lawsuit. The only triable issue on the
question will be the simple one of whether the warning as issued com-
plies with the standard form.2' At this point, it becomes necessary to
20 For an elaboration, see Epstein, supra note 1, at 119-28.
21 Weisbard takes a different view on vaccines, claiming that it is socially unfair to have
one person suffer from vaccine-related illness without compensation so that others may benefit.
Weisbard, supra note 10, at 1165-69. His view is that, in the absence of some legislative system
of no-fault compensation, the tort system should be invoked. He thus defends the current
position, as set forth in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974), and Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). It
is a disastrous social prescription. First, it assumes incorrectly that vaccine injury raises a
"we-they" question, where there is some determinate group of persons that benefits and an-
other that pays. This opposition is a false one because no one knows ex ante who will get what
illness, with or without vaccines; but we do know that reducing the overall level of illness
leaves everyone better off, even if no explicit compensation is provided ex post. Given the
choice between a 10% chance of the natural disease and a 0. 1% chance of vaccine injury, who
would not assume the latter to be rid of the former?
Second, Weisbard writes as though imposition of tort liability had no adverse allocative
consequences. His position is belied by the massive disruption in vaccine markets. Supplies
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use the administrative process to determine the content of the warn-
ing, a task already required under the present rules. To be sure, the
public input on the question will have to be stronger, precisely be-
cause there is no judicial check on the matter of adequacy. Nonethe-
less, there are huge gains from balanced warnings that do not conceal
the net benefits of taking the product. Where there are special cases
(for example, whether the vaccine should be given to pregnant women
or to asthmatics) a sound set of warnings could indicate persons at
special risk, and for whom consultation with a physician might be
appropriate. Any system of warnings could be published in newspa-
pers and distributed through physicians long before the drug or vac-
cine is used, in order to allow time for study and review. Any
warning so prescribed should, of course, be quickly updated as new
information is revealed. The system itself should be viable, because its
costs can be spread over a large number of production units.
In making this proposal, I do not want to suggest that the admin-
istrative process is ideal. Indeed, the FDA has been highly criticized
because of its conservative approach to the release of new drugs on
the market. Nonetheless, if we are prepared to trust to the agency the
basic decision of whether or not the drug will be marketed, then it
seems odd to say that it cannot confront, with an assist from the med-
ical profession, the warning issue as well. Warnings and package in-
serts are already required by the FDA, so the critical point is only to
provide the firms safe harbor when they comply with the demands of
the statute. Once lawyers have little to gain from the way the warn-
ings are phrased, one divisive element is removed from the fray. On
matters of this sort, it should be possible to find enough persons with
independent judgment to minimize the risk that drug companies will
are now being interrupted and work on new vaccines has been cut back. In consequence, the
present tort liability may push us back to a worse social state for all persons: There could be
less tort liability because there are fewer vaccines. A vaccine-related injury compensation sys-
tem may be desirable, or it may not; but there is no reason whatsoever for courts to impose
perverse tort liabilities and punitive damages, against the clear weight of the evidence, because
the legislature has not adopted some no-fault compensation program. It is wholly mistaken to
act as if vaccines take lives while ignoring the great number of lives they save. There is no one
who does not grieve at "the plight of a young girl afflicted with polio." Weisbard, supra note
10, at 1176. It is precisely to minimize the number of such cases that the vaccinemakers
should not be made to fund a compensation program under the clumsy auspices of the tort
system. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1985). Note too that the passage of the recent National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 311, 1987 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News (100 Stat.), does not yield the neat solution that Weisbard envisions. We now
have a compensation system plus tort remedies plus punitive damages. The interconnections
among the various systems are very intricate and difficult to understand. Yet, they are inferior
to any ideal solution because they refuse to vest the written warnings with the type of finality
that they deserve, especially in the mass-tort context.
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softpedal their warnings in order to escape liability. Where compa-
nies do withhold or tamper with the evidence, then very severe penal-
ties, both civil and criminal, are warranted as is the case under
current law.
It may be objected that the need for fixed standards is alarmist
because the price of drugs is free to move to take into account the
added liabilities. Empirically, the swine-flu cases and the recent cases
of Bendectin and of pertussis vaccine have shown the point to be false.
Firms withdraw from the market, even if they are free to set whatever
price they choose. The easy way to explain the point is to treat the
present rules on products liability as a restraint upon voluntary con-
tractual transactions, at least in one dimension-product warranties.
When the price term is free to move while the liability term is not,
there need not be a market clearing price which will allow production
to continue. The key question is whether the costs generated by the
new liability rules exceed the joint gains to consumers and producers
under the previous voluntary contract. If in the aggregate the net
gains are wiped out by the liability costs, then the product will no
longer be made. If some net gains survive, then fewer units will be
produced to reflect the changes in rules and some marginal consumers
must do without.
The critical question, then, is how to estimate the size of the
losses imposed by the present legal regime. Several points suggest
that these are substantial. First, there are very heavy administrative
costs to work the transfers from which no consumer derives any di-
rect benefit even though producers must charge to cover them. Sec-
ond, there is the possibility-real today-that the damages awards
paid will exceed those demanded in private markets.2 2 Damages
levels for death cases may be too high, and excessive levels of coverage
may be provided when collateral benefits-for example, medical in-
surance-are not subtracted from recovery. Third, once the defend-
ant is not safe on the warning question, it may be forced to pay for
losses that its products did not cause, if there is false attribution of
disease to the vaccine. This problem arose in vivid fashion in the Sa-
bin vaccine cases.23 In such cases, the risk arises because the vaccine
tends to be called into use when the risk of polio is greater. It is,
therefore, very easy to charge against the vaccine an illness brought
on by natural causes. Similarly, with the pertussis vaccine, the risk is
22 See the evidence collected in Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in
Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 517, 522-30 (1984).
23 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
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that severe damage brought on by independent causes is chalked up
erroneously as a side effect of the vaccine or that the vaccine only
hastens harmful conditions that would have occurred anyway. In
each case, the erroneous attributions after the fact lead one to over-
state the risks of the vaccine and hence to overstate its true cost of
production. These errors then work themselves back into the pricing
and production decisions. At some point, if the number of false posi-
tives attributed to a vaccine rises sufficiently, then the private costs
imposed upon the manufacturer diverge from the social costs of the
vaccine. Systematic underproduction results. Drug companies are
not in the risky end of the life insurance business. If their losses from
the line of production exceed the profits that they can make from the
sale of vaccines, then they will leave the market. The enormous con-
sumer surplus from the purchase of vaccines can be, and has been,
dissipated by unsound liability rules. The public health benefits are
likewise lost. Markets work because the costs to the seller are justified
by the benefits to buyer. They cannot survive when costs are falsely
charged to the seller for whom there are, in fact, no parallel buyer
benefits.
B. Experimental Situations
The proper role of medical malpractice and products-liability law
in experimental situations is, if anything, more complicated because
the level of information about risks is necessarily lower than in the
routine cases just discussed. Nonetheless, the same analytical frame-
work applies, because the central function of the legal rules still
should be to provide consumers with the lower levels of information
that are available. Imperfect information is better than no informa-
tion at all. Within the experimental context, matters are often espe-
cially vexing, since controlled studies are designed to isolate the
effects of a given drug or treatment. Typically, the size of the sample
will be far smaller than the groups that are involved with mass-vacci-
nation programs. Nonetheless, they will be large enough for the re-
sults that flow from them to be of statistical significance. Given these
modest economies of scale, standardized warning procedures should
be available to reduce the role of tort liability against either physicians
or drug manufacturers.
The traditional rules of tort liability function fitfully at best in
experimental situations. The standards of customary care, for exam-
ple, lack specificity when dealing with treatments or techniques for
which no customary practices have yet been established. To be sure,
it is possible to develop a set of metacustoms which are designed to
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deal with those particular gaps in knowledge, but these rules will have
far less bite than specific directives about the use of given products or
treatments. In addition, the doctrine of informed consent is under far
greater pressure, first, because the persistent conflicts of interest be-
tween the physician's experiment and the patient's well-being,24 and
second, greater uncertainty means that there is much more that
should be said about the problems.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the tort ap-
proach has not proved adequate for the task. Instead, the dominant
institutional response works at two levels. The first is to insist upon
individual consent on the part of persons who work in the programs.
Such consent must bring home the fact that they will often be in-
volved in double-blind experiments in which they may not receive the
treatment a researcher believes, but is unsure, is preferred.25 The sec-
ond is to insist upon independent review boards, given that many of
the risks themselves are hard to convey to individual patients. The
function of the boards is to act as independent experts before the fact
and to pass upon the desirability of the programs in the abstract. The
hard question is always whether this extra layer of protection is worth
the costs that it imposes, as measured both by its direct costs and by
the soundness and the speed of its internal procedures. That question
is extremely difficult for someone outside the medical establishment to
evaluate. Much may turn upon the particular details of institutional
organization which vary widely from board to board and from case to
case. Indeed, even if one could show that the decisions across boards
are wildly inconsistent with each other,26 it does not necessarily fol-
low that the procedures should be condemned. It could well be that
the average level of experimentation is higher when there are boards
than when investigators are left to their own discretion. Nonetheless,
these boards cannot be dismissed simply as a governmental creation
by persons like myself who believe in the superiority of voluntary con-
tracts over governmental regulation. The participants in these experi-
ments might well want some form of external independent review to
offset their own ignorance. The risk of governmental regulation is
that it imposes a monopoly of practices that makes it difficult to ob-
tain the information that might lead to informed choices. The rele-
vant variables are many, and certain situations-for example,
psychological harm-may not call for as much supervision as others.
24 The point is stressed in C. Fried, Medical Experimentation: Personal Integrity and So-
cial Policy 29-36 (1974).
25 Id. at 32-36.
26 See, e.g., Goldman & Katz, Inconsistency and Institutional Review Boards, 248 J.
A.M.A. 197, 197-202 (1982).
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Yet the insistence on uniform standards prevents the acquisition of
additional information by institutional experimentation.27 The boards
may well serve to introduce this needed variation.
These forms of direct control also bear upon the question of
whether there is a place for individual compensation for bad outcomes
within the experimental setting. Here my own answer comes in two
parts. First, the central purpose of the elaborate mechanisms of dis-
closure and review up front are a good reason to displace the tort-
liability system after the fact. I do not have any objection to tort
damages actions for injuries sustained because of departures from the
experimental design. These cases are too close to the routine cases of
inadvertent deviation from custom. Yet, by the same token, I think
that it is mischievous, or worse, to look behind the experimental de-
sign after the fact when the outcomes are bad, as they often will be.
As with the warnings in vaccine programs, the gains from experimen-
tal work can easily be dissipated by lawsuits that depend upon second-
guessing the myriad difficult choices necessary for any experimental
design.
Second, should some other compensation system be set up for
participants in the program who have bad outcomes, wholly without
regard to improper conduct by the medical personnel? Again, my
response is to resist the proposal. One initial point is that it is very
difficult to determine the baseline against which compensation is
awarded. In many experimental programs, such as those for cancer,
the persons who participate are in very dire circumstances to begin
with, so that bad outcomes will be the norm, even where the proposed
innovation enjoys some modest success. Any system of compensa-
tion, therefore, must be able to measure the marginal contribution of
the experimental input, which may well be small compared to the un-
derlying disease. There are also many forms of implicit compensation
that derive from the simple fact of participation in experimental pro-
grams, not the least of which is superior conventional medical care of
the sort that helped throw off the original investigations into the effi-
cacy of diethylstilbestrol ("DES").28 The persons who elect to partici-
pate in these programs, moreover, can easily be made to understand
that compensation is not forthcoming. Consent remains consent,
27 Note that it is implicit in this argument that institutional uniformity accounts for far less
here than it does in any mass distribution of drugs or vaccines, which I believe is the case. The
variation between programs is greater, and there is no concern with inconsistent results, be-
cause the separate programs need not be subject to litigation under a common rule.
28 These were corrected by the Dieckmann study. Dieckmann, Davis, Rynkiewicz & Pot-
tinger, Does Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Value?,
66 Am. J. Obstetrics and Gynecology 1062, 1062-81 (1953).
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even if the options available to the participant are limited by the dis-
ease, for the defendant only expands the set of opportunities for the
patient that the disease itself limits. There seems, therefore, little rea-
son to bear the very heavy additional costs that a compensation sys-
tem will impose. The funds saved could be turned to more productive
uses.
C. The Unknowable Hazard
The last case that needs to be considered is that of the unknown
and unknowable hazard of certain medical or product innovations.
As before, the problem is one that can arise either in a medical mal-
practice or a products liability setting. Arguably, the routine use of
radiation to treat tonsillitis falls into this category, as does the use of
DES, with its untoward side effects. In all these cases, the traditional
legal view was that liability did not attach where the treatments or
drugs met the applicable standards. In the medical malpractice con-
text, the general rule of customary care provided a limitation upon
liability: It was no longer necessary to test a procedure forever before
adopting it as a matter of general use. Under the law of products
liability, the general position was that strict liability principles did not
apply to drugs that fell into this category.
The question of liability for unknowable defects has been much
mooted in recent cases. While there was some move to hold defend-
ants liable for such risks in at least one state, there has generally been
a quick retreat, at least in the drug cases. 29 There is commendable
caution in the limited situation. The critical arguments parallel those
in cases of warning for adequate defects. It is simply that the accumu-
lated costs and errors of the system, be it in determining causation or
damages, threaten to exceed the enormous gains from marketing new
products or using new medical technologies. With drugs, the institu-
tional response is preferable. The obvious idea is to encourage only
that level of investment in resources that is cost-justified. The system
will keep too many beneficial products and treatments off the market
if it insists that they be risk-free. Instead of allowing reasonableness
standards after the fact to decide whether liability is appropriate, it
becomes critical to answer the liability question in conclusive form
before products are marketed.30 I have no great confidence in the
29 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), which
laid the risk of unknowable hazards on manufacturers in asbestos cases, followed by the appar-
ent retreat in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
30 The received wisdom is otherwise. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51,
507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973). My quarrel with that decision is not with the proposi-
tion that all administrative procedures are ideal, but that the costs of finding out which deter-
1987] 1157
HeinOnline  -- 8 Cardozo L. Rev.  1157 1986-1987
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
ability of the FDA to determine the optimal level of social research on
drugs. The point is, given that the FDA undertakes that inquiry as
apt of its general licensing procedures, there is little to be gained by
running every case through the second filter of common law reason-
ableness standards. Those tests are difficult enough to apply in rou-
tine accident cases, and the cost and error in their elaboration only
increase when applied to firm and industry behavior that may well
have taken place decades ago. Risks are surely higher when dangers
are unknown, but it does not follow that the difference in risk levels
dictates a greater common-law liability for unknowable hazards.
Rather, so long as the information that is acquired has been trans-
ferred, and all appropriate administrative procedures have been fol-
lowed, the providers of the product should be spared liability.
The same administrative route is not available in cases of medical
practice, given the lack of any centralized system of approval. By
default, therefore, customary standards are the appropriate ones for
litigation. Here, as above, no one should defend the use of custom on
the ground that it is perfect; clearly it is not. Most customary prac-
tices, for example, are not routinely verified by randomized control
trials before they are placed into use.31 But the best should never be
made the enemy of the good. Randomized experiments are costly to
operate and difficult to maintain in the face of the ethical objections
raised to them-for example, when it is suspected that one course of
treatment is superior to another in a given case. The debate over
whether they should be adopted routinely is one that can proceed
elsewhere, but the important point is that, unless and until that day is
reached, customary standards should afford the complete defense,
leaving the control of unknown risks to the steady, if erratic, course of
medical science.
CONCLUSION
The question of legal liability for medical innovation is part of a
larger complex of issues that relate to the liability of medical services
minations are right and which are wrong are so fraught with error that we are better off not
incurring the costs that the inquiry entails. For a defense of the cost-benefit analysis of warn-
ings, see Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances
and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985).
31 See, e.g., McKinlay, From Promising Report to Standard Procedure: Seven Stages in the
Career of a Medical Innovation, 59 Health & Soc'y: Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 374 (1981).
Notwithstanding the strong criticisms of the current procedures used to assess new drugs and
therapies, McKinlay does not raise the possibility that tort liability should be imposed upon
physicians who follow customary practices. For a more guarded reception of randomized con-
trolled trials, see C. Fried, supra note 24, at 50-60.
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and products generally. In all of these cases risks are involved, know-
able or not, quantifiable or not. There are obviously large social gains
that can be obtained from the control or the elimination of these risks.
The issue is not whether an investment should be made, but where it
should be made. In my view, the place of tort liability within this
scheme is limited. Lawsuits are a poor place in which to determine
the wisdom of various courses of treatment on which the experts
themselves are divided. They are a poor place to review the subjective
judgments of individual patients and consumers who now are disap-
pointed with choices that may have been rational in their inception, if
unfortunate in their consequences. The best we can expect of the judi-
cial system is to ensure that the standards that are developed else-
where-be it by statute or administrative order, by institutional
review board or ordinary custom-are applied faithfully in the cases
that they govern. It is hard enough to perform accurately the transla-
tion function in order to ensure that standards developed elsewhere
are applied sensibly within the legal context. It is quite beyond the
power of courts to use the amorphous principles of cost-benefit analy-
sis to forge independent standards for judging the provision of medi-
cal goods and services. There is great virtue in doing small tasks well.
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